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ABSTRACT  
The goal of this paper is to study how cash holdings were affected by the financial crisis 
of 2008. Our results suggest that 2008 financial crisis had a negative impact on cash 
holdings and in the period from 2008 to 2014, contrarily to the 2009 and 2010. We 
hypothesize that firms in face of the present levels cash holdings do not need to 
accumulate more cash to eventual shortfalls. Our results show a negative impact of the 
shareholder rights on cash holdings during the financial crisis of 2008 and from 2008 to 
2014. Possibly precautionary motive is losing power as explanatory theory, contrarily to 
agency hypothesis. We also have showed that cash holdings from collectivistic countries 
expresses a higher decrease in 2008 and from 2008 to 2014, contrarily to 2009 and 2010. 
The results for 2008 and from 2008 to 2014 contradicted our expectations once we have 
expected a lower decrease for nations where uncertainty and ambiguity is less tolerated 
accepted. It seems that collectivistic countries are tolerating more the risk because cash 
holdings reached values never recorded.   
 
Keywords: Financial crisis; Culture; Shareholder rights. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Why are firms hoarding large amounts of cash when there is no profitability in doing so? 
According to a study by PWC on non-financial corporations, there has been an average 
increase in firms’ cash holding from the period of 2000 to 2014. Even after the major 
financial crisis of 2008, firms still hoard more cash than before. Is this a trend we will 
keep seeing in the future? Another recent article by Forbes presents that Alphabet is worth 
$500 billion, despite holding $80 billion in bank, which means that if you buy a share of 
Alphabet, you are effectively buying more than $100 in cash. Are companies sitting on 
cash because they have no growth opportunities or is there another reason to do so?  
In fact, cash holdings are an important topic of corporate finance once when 
practioneers are valuing firms they discount the cash effects. However, cash holdings are 
also a central subject on corporate finance because they are often used to hedge against 
future cash shortfalls. Particularly, when there are many credit constraints and capital 
markets devaluation as result of financial crisis (Graham and Harvey (2001)). In fact, 
after the dot.com bubble, the subprime mortgage crisis and the European sovereign debt 
crisis, firms experienced difficulties on fundraising their activities and cash holdings 
behaved as a buffer to credit and capital market limitations. Cash holdings seem to be 
used as a precaution to financial distress as Keynes (1936) defined. The results of Ferreira 
and Vilela (2004) and Almeida et al. (2004) defend precaution as the main motive of 
firms holding cash. Keynes also considered the transaction and speculative motives to 
hold cash. The transaction motive is related with non-synchronisation between firms´ 
receipts and expenditures. The speculative motive, by its turn, is a strategy used by firms 
to hold cash so as to make the best use of any investment opportunity that arises later on. 
Other plausible reason to hold cash is related with fiscal environment, namely the tax for 
repatriating foreign income. In this case, firms prefer to hold cash instead of paying 
dividends (Foley et al. (2007)). However, the agency motive is the challenger of 
precautionary motive as explanation of cash holdings. Agency theory suggests that 
managers have an incentive to build up cash to increase the amount of assets under their 
control and to gain discretionary power over the firm investment decision (Dittmar et al. 
(2003) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)).  
The determinants of cash holdings have been widely studied recently. The firm 
determinants of cash holdings are consensual (Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela 
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(2004) and Al-Najjar (2013)) and are related to leverage, dividend payments, profitability, 
growth opportunities, firm size, capital expenditures and cash flow volatility. These firm 
variables explain the most well know corporate financing theories: trade off theory, 
pecking order theory and agency theory. However, the debate about cash holdings has 
centered on which motive influence it the most, particularly the precaution and agency 
motive, and more recently the growth opportunities motive. Opler et al. (1999), for a 
sample of US firms from 1971-94, did not find a strong relationship between cash 
holdings and agency costs. Similar results have been found by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
for a sample of UK firms, by Faulkender (2002) for a sample of small US firms, by 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) for a sample of European firms, and by Kalcheva and Lins 
(2007) for a sample of firms from 31 countries. However, Ditmar et al. (2003) found on 
agency costs an important determinant of cash holdings. Ditmar et al. (2007) highlight 
the role of corporate governance on cash holdings. According to their results the value of 
a dollar cash is lower if a firm presents lower standards of corporate governance. Gao et 
al. (2013) compared cash policies in public and private U.S. firms and concluded that the 
former present higher levels of liquidity and such is explained by agency costs. Lins et 
al. (2010), by its turn, showed that cash holdings are related to non-operational activities. 
In fact, these savings are made to avoid future cash shortfalls (precaution) instead of has 
being used in future growth opportunities.  
The cash holdings trends have also been studied. Bates el al. (2009), for example, 
showed that US firms since the 1980s have increased their average cash holdings, 
contrarily to net debt. Graham et al (2015) documented, for a sample of firms traded on 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, not only a recent increase on firm cash holdings, but also 
the same pattern from 1920 to 1945 and the opposite from 1945 to 1970. Alves (2018) 
also exhibited, for a sample of firms from 41 countries, a rise on cash holdings from 1995 
to 2014.  
We contribute to the literature by studying the evolution of cash holdings during 
the crisis and post-crisis of 2008. The role of shareholder rights and culture had also been 
studied, particularly with the interaction of financial crisis of 2008.  
Our results have showed that 2008 financial crisis had a negative impact on cash 
holdings and in the period from 2008 to 2014, contrarily to the 2009 and 2010. In fact, 
firms´ cash holdings have increased in 2009 and 2010 as precaution face to the opposite 
impact observed in 2008 consequence of financial crisis. We highlight likewise the 
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negative impact of cash holdings from 2008 to 2014, questioning whether the trend of 
cash holdings’ increasing will not have reached its maximum. Perhaps firms in face of 
the present levels cash holdings do not need to accumulate more cash to eventual 
shortfalls. 
Our results show a negative impact of the shareholder rights on cash holdings 
during the financial crisis of 2008. This result seems to strength the role of agency theory 
on cash holdings once it seems that managers are worried to use indiscriminately cash in 
negative NPV projects devaluating shareholder wealth. On the contrary, in 2009 and 2010 
we observe a positive impact of shareholder rights on cash holdings, contradicting agency 
theory. However, the opposite occurred in the period from 2008 to 2014, although the 
impact had not been conclusive for all countries. As we previous referred possibly 
precautionary motive is losing power as explanatory theory, contrarily to agency 
hypothesis.    
On the other hand, we also have showed that cash holdings from collectivistic 
countries expresses a higher decrease in 2008 and from 2008 to 2014, contrarily to 2009 
and 2010. The results for 2008 and from 2008 to 2014 contradicted our expectations once 
we expect a lower decrease for nations where uncertainty and ambiguity is less tolerated 
accepted. These results are extensively to countries with different levels of capital market 
development, but not to different countries with different kind of law.  
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
hypothesis formulation and section 3 describes data and methodology. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION 
 
2.1. Financial Crisis 
 
The impact of recent financial crises on cash holdings has also been studied (Khale and 
Stulz (2013), Song and Lee (2012), Pinkowitz et al. (2013) and Alves (2018)). Kahle and 
Stulz (2013) present a decrease on firms´ cash holdings during 2007-2008 followed by a 
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sharp increase in 2009. Song and Lee (2012) show that the increase in cash holdings is 
not explained by changes in firm characteristics but by changes in the firm’s demand 
function for cash, particularly the precautionary motive. Pinkowitz et al. (2013) show that 
American firms hold cash after the crisis more than firms with similar characteristics in 
the late 1990s, and that occurs for more profitable firms. Cash holdings seem to be 
supported by growth opportunities, instead precaution motive. Bliss et al. (2015) findings 
are also more in line with the growth opportunities hypothesis. The results of Alves 
(2018), by its turn, do not support the growth opportunities hypothesis once the impact of 
2008 financial crisis on cash holdings (non-operational activities) was positive, contrarily 
to retained earnings (growth opportunities) and concluded, not only, for the existence of 
an increase on such variable after that event, but a negative impact of GDP growth on 
cash holdings. Graham and Leary (2015) using this indicator showed that, using data from 
1920 until 2012 of US Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), cash holdings have 
a positive relation with GDP Growth. 
H1: Firms´ cash holdings have decreased on year 2008. 
H2: Firms´ cash holdings have increased on years 2008-2014. 
H3: Firms´ cash holdings have increased on years 2009-2010. 
In this context, we also evaluate the impact of GDP growth and inflation on cash holdings.  
 
2.2. Shareholder Rights 
 
The impact of shareholder protection on agency costs of managerial entrenchment has 
been widely studied (LLSV (2002), Claessens et al (2002), Lins (2003), e.g.) and it is 
consensual that managers can benefit of overinvestment when country-level protection is 
weak. Cash holdings can be used for such purpose. On the other hand, lower shareholder 
protection standards are associated to less external finance opportunities (La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998)) and holding cash can be an alternative to undeveloped capital markets and 
banking systems. However, in line with the relevance of agency costs, some authors 
(Dittmar et al. (2003), e.g.) show firms placed on developed financial markets holding 
larger cash balances. In fact, the evidence does not point out that firms hold more cash 
simply because it is more difficult to access capital markets in countries with poor 
shareholder protection. Abundant research supporting a positive relationship between 
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shareholder protection and external financial opportunities (La Porta et al. (1997, 1998)) 
has been published. Identical relation has found for the impact of private credit on cash 
holdings (Kalcheva and Lins (2007), Lins et al. (2010)) and Alves (2018)). This indicates 
that there is no evidence for managers holding more cash simply because it is more 
difficult to access capital in markets with poor shareholder protection. In fact, the 
explanation for holding cash can be motivated by another issue, the agency theory, e.g., 
in the possibility of managers extracting wealth from shareholders. The impact of legal 
system, shareholders’ rights and agency costs on cash holdings has been studied by 
several authors (Ditmar et al. (2003), Harford et al. (2008), Kalcheva and Lins (2007) 
and Lins et al. (2010)). Kalcheva and Lins (2007) document a negative relationship 
between cash holdings and shareholder protection, although without statistical 
significance. On the contrary, there is a profuse investigation about the role of agency 
costs on cash holdings, that is, research that shows firms holding less cash in countries 
with a weaker corporate governance system (Harford et al. (2008) and Pinkowitz et al. 
(2006)). 
H4: Firms´ cash holdings were negatively influenced by shareholders rights . 
The “antidirector rights index” of La Porta et al. (1998), that varies from 0 to 5, is 
used as a measure of shareholder protection. RL is rule of law and is from Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)). 
Annual Estimates of governance range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
governance performance. We measure domestic credit as the domestic credit provided by 
financial sector (%GDP) as an indicator for the banking sector development and financial 
sector depth in a given country and year (source: World Bank). Capital market 
development is measured by market capitalization and is defined as the total value of all 
listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (source: World Bank). 
 
2.3. Culture 
 
Recent research has focused on the impact of cultural differences on different topics of 
corporate finance, namely on capital structure (Chui et al. (2002), Hackbarth (2008) and 
Fauver and MacDonald (2015)) and on cash holdings decisions (Ramirez and Tadesse 
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(2009), Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) and Chen et al. (2015)). In fact, the traditional 
paradigm that assumes agents are rational pursuing the maximum utility is contradicted 
in psychology documents which refer managers tend to be overconfident and optimistic. 
Overconfidence and optimism tend to be higher on individualistic societies. While 
individualistic cultures put the emphasis on autonomy and on the challenging of the self, 
on collectivist nations the role of the group and their happiness is the most important 
value and the participation of the group is more prevalent (Hofstede et al. (2001)).  A 
nation where uncertainty and ambiguity is more tolerated accepts the change and takes 
more and greater risks. In this sense, in countries formed by collectivistic social 
organizations firms tend to have higher debt ratios, as well as higher cash holdings. 
Following this line of research Ramirez and Tadesse (2009) show that firms in countries 
with high uncertainty avoidance hold more cash as a way to hedge against undesired states 
of nature. Chen et al. (2015) demonstrate that corporate cash holdings are negatively 
affected by individualism and positively affected by uncertainty avoidance. Chang and 
Noorbakhsh (2009) find that corporations hold larger cash and liquid balances in 
countries where the people tend to avoid uncertainty more. 
H5: Firms in individualistic counties hold less cash than forms in collectivist countries. 
Collectivism index is from Globe (https://globeproject.com/study_2004_2007#data) and 
varies from 1 (low collectivism) to 7 (high collectivism). 
 
2.4. Firms characteristics  
 
The firm determinants of cash holdings used for our study are the following: Dividend 
payout, Cash-flow, Cash-flow uncertainty, Liquidity, Leverage, Research and 
development (here forward mentioned as R&D), Tangibility, Growth opportunity and 
Size. The goal is to summarize all previous empirical evidence on these determinants. 
 The firm determinants of cash holdings are explained by the well known corporate 
financing theories: trade off theory (Myers (1977)), pecking order theory (Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and agency theory (Jensen (1986)). Trade off theory means firms set their 
optimal level of cash holdings comparing the marginal costs and marginal benefits of 
holding cash. While the main cost of holding cash is the opportunity cost of the capital 
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invested in liquid assets, the benefits of holding cash are associated to the lower 
transaction costs (related with the use of cash for payments instead to liquidate assets), 
reduction in the probability of financial distress and the possibility of implementing 
investments that could not be possible without that funds. The pecking order theory (POT) 
postulates that external financing is costly because there is asymmetric information 
between managers and investors. Consequently, firms should finance investments first 
with retained earnings, then with safe debt and risky debt, and finally with equity to 
minimize asymmetric information costs and other financing costs. According to this 
theory, contrarily to trade off theory, firms do not have target cash levels and cash is used 
as a buffer between retained earnings and investment needs. The free cash flow theory, 
by its turn, hypothesizes that managers have an incentive to build up cash to increase the 
amount of assets under their control and to gain discretionary power over the firm 
investment decision. Cash reduces the pressure to perform well and allows managers to 
invest in projects that best suit their own interests, but may not be in the shareholders best 
interest. 
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Table 1 – Firm variables definitions and summary of model predictions 
Variable definition Trade-off theory 
Pecking 
order theory 
Free cash-flow 
theory 
Dividend 
payout 
Dividend payment is a binary 
variable. Negative   
 
Cash-flow 
Cash-flow is the ratio of cash-
flow to assets. Cash-flow is 
earnings less dividends plus 
amortizations. 
Negative Positive  
Liquidity 
Liquidity is the ratio of working 
capital minus cash and short-
term investments to total sales. 
Negative   
Cash flow 
uncertainty 
Cash-flow uncertainty is the 
volatility of a firm´ s cash-flow 
(to assets) from 1995 to 2014. 
Industry sigma represents the 
annual average volatility of the 
firm´s sector from 1995 to 2014. 
Positive   
Leverage 
Leverage is computed as the 
ratio of total debt divided by 
total assets. 
Negative Negative Negative 
R&D 
R&D is R&D expenses to sales 
ratio. Firms that do not report 
R&D expenses are considered 
to have zero R&D expenses. 
Positive Positive  
Tangibility Tangibility is measured by tangible assets to total assets.  Negative Positive 
 
Growth 
opportunity 
Growth opportunities is 
measured by market-to-book 
ratio (MtB). MtB is total 
liabilities plus market 
capitalization to total assets.  
Positive Positive Negative 
Size 
Size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the book value of 
assets deflated in 1995 dollars. 
Negative Positive Positive 
 
3. DATA SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
The data extracted from WorldScope include firms from 32 countries: Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, the Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the US.  The sample is diversified and includes 
28,132 firms and 202,871 observations, covering emerging capital markets, namely, the 
largest, such as Mexico and Brazil; several developed capital markets, such as the UK 
and the US; diverse banking-oriented countries, including France and Germany; countries 
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with different levels of investor protection, such as Italy and Hong Kong; nations with a 
collectivist environment like the Philippines, by opposition to individualistic countries as 
Switzerland; and countries whose economies show different levels of economic growth, 
such as Singapore and Greece (see Table 1). Data cover the period from 1995 to 2014. 
All firm-level variables are winsorized, excluding the bottom and the top 1% of the own 
variable distribution. In addition, financial institutions and utilities are excluded due the 
regulatory rules to which they are subject.  
In previous literature two major ways of calculating cash holdings ratio have been 
developed. The first one divides cash and equivalents by total assets (Kim et al., 1998; 
Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) and the second one divides cash and cash equivalents by net 
assets (total assets minus cash and cash equivalents) (Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and 
Vilela, 2004). In this study, we have adopted the second definition of cash holdings. 
Figure 1 presents firms´ annual average cash holdings from 1995 to 2014. It 
presents a positive trend from 1995 to 2014, beginning with 15,2% and ending on 19,1%, 
with a peak of 19,8% in 2010. These figures are in line with both Opler et al. (1999), 
which for a sample of US firms obtained a cash holding average of 17% and with Ferreira 
and Vilela (2004), which for a sample of EMU firms obtaining an average value of 15% 
for cash holdings.  
Despite the development of financing markets, firms have increased their cash 
holding levels, revealing signs about the importance of maintaining liquid a high 
percentage of assets (Keynes (1936)). Such means that difficulties on external financing 
is not the only reason to hold cash.  Actually, firms placed on developed capital markets 
have had, on annual average, from 1995 to 2014, 17,7% of their assets on cash. By its 
turn, firms located in emerging markets have presented 14,1% of their assets on cash. The 
mean differences present statistical significance. Comparing firms´ cash holdings located 
in common and civil law based countries we have not found a significantly statistical 
difference on means (17,0% against 17,7%). Consequently, it is not obvious that firms 
cash holdings are influenced by legal environment. 
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Fig. 1. Average cash holding ratio for the period of 1995-2014. 
 
 
Average cash holding ratio for the period of 1995 to 2014 for our sample of firms year 
observations. Cash holding ratio is measured as cash and cash equivalents divided by net assets, 
where net assets is total assets minus cash and cash equivalents 
 
Table 1 presents results for firm and country variables. Cash holdings are 
particularly higher in Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore, contrarily to Portugal, New 
Zealand, Argentina, Mexico and Greece. Such seems to confirm that firms located in 
countries with undeveloped financial markets present lower levels of cash holdings. Thus, 
it is not obvious that external finance difficulties is a reason to maintain cash. Firms 
placed on Japan and Finland, by its turn, are characterized by paying dividends, contrarily 
to Canadian, Israeli and Australian firms.  Such explains the lower cash flow created by 
Australian and Canadian firms. In Philippines, Italy and Ireland firms present the highest 
values for liquidity. The opposite occurs in Finland, Denmark and Germany. Australia 
and Portugal present the largest and the lowest values for leverage. United States present 
the largest value for investment on R&D. This may explain why US firms have growth 
opportunities. The largest firms are located on Mexico and Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11,0%
12,0%
13,0%
14,0%
15,0%
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18,0%
19,0%
20,0%
21,0%
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics of Firm-Level and Country-Level Variables 
 
All firm variables are from Worldscope. CH is cash and cash equivalents by net assets (total assets minus 
cash and cash equivalents). DividendD is a binary variable. CF is the ratio of cash-flow to assets. Cash-
flow is the ratio of cash-flow to assets. Cash-flow is earnings less dividends plus amortizations. NWC is 
the ratio of working capital minus cash and short-term investments to total sales. Cash-flow uncertainty is 
the volatility of a firm´ s cash-flow (to assets) from 1995 to 2014. Industry sigma represents the annual 
average volatility of the firm´s sector from 1995 to 2014. D/A is computed as the ratio of total debt divided 
by total assets. R&D is R&D expenses to sales ratio. Firms that do not report R&D expenses are considered 
to have zero R&D expenses. Tang is measured by tangible assets to total assets. MtB is total liabilities plus 
market capitalization to total assets. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets 
deflated in 1995 dollars. DC is defined as domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP 
(source: World Bank). MK is capital market development and is defined as the total value of all listed shares 
in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (source: World Bank). RL is rule of law and is from Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)). Estimate of 
governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance) Inflation is 
from World Bank. GDP Growth source is also from World Bank. SR are shareholder rights and varies from 
1 to 5 (La Porta et al. (1999)). Collectivism index is from Globe 
(https://globeproject.com/study_2004_2007#data) and varies from 1 (low collectivism) to 7 (high 
collectivism). Firms and N are the number of firms and observations, respectively. Sample period is from 
1995 to 2014. 
 
 
 
Cash holdings are highly correlated with liquidity, industry sigma, leverage, research and 
development, tangibility, growth opportunities and size. The negative correlation with liquidity 
was expected once liquid assets other than cash can be liquidated in the event of a cash shortage, 
Country Cash 
Holdings
Dividend
D
CF NWC Industry 
Sigma
D/A R&D Tang MtB Size DC MK RL Inflation GDP 
Growth
SR Collectivism Nº Firms Nº OBS
ARGENTINA 0,10 0,42 0,06 0,04 0,13 0,21 0,00 0,40 1,18 11,67 0,32 0,15 -0,59 0,14 3,9% 4 6,15 78 781
AUSTRALIA 0,19 0,36 -0,03 0,00 0,16 0,16 0,01 0,40 1,66 9,39 1,31 1,08 1,76 0,03 3,1% 4 5,75 1 912 12 593
AUSTRIA 0,14 0,65 0,06 0,03 0,13 0,26 0,02 0,33 1,27 12,54 1,25 0,25 1,85 0,01 2,0% 2 5,27 125 1 083
BRAZIL 0,15 0,58 0,03 0,00 0,13 0,28 0,00 0,36 1,29 12,47 0,84 0,48 -0,27 0,10 3,1% 3 5,15 395 3 156
CANADA 0,14 0,28 0,02 0,01 0,16 0,22 0,02 0,46 1,63 10,93 1,84 1,09 1,74 0,02 2,4% 5 5,97 2 253 13 161
DENMARK 0,14 0,57 0,07 0,06 0,14 0,26 0,02 0,33 1,52 11,87 1,85 0,53 1,89 0,02 1,4% 2 5,5 215 2 007
EGYPT 0,20 0,72 0,06 0,04 0,13 0,17 0,00 0,38 1,48 10,95 0,84 0,51 -0,25 0,10 4,4% 2 5,56 138 905
FINLAND 0,15 0,75 0,07 0,06 0,14 0,25 0,02 0,28 1,56 12,53 0,99 1,10 1,95 0,02 2,4% 3 5,42 156 1 752
FRANCE 0,17 0,57 0,06 0,03 0,14 0,22 0,01 0,19 1,47 12,21 1,19 0,74 1,40 0,01 1,7% 3 5,42 1 112 9 703
GERMANY 0,16 0,46 0,05 0,09 0,14 0,21 0,02 0,26 1,52 12,22 1,37 0,45 1,64 0,01 1,4% 1 5,18 1 008 8 759
GREECE 0,10 0,53 0,03 0,05 0,13 0,30 0,00 0,36 1,40 11,16 1,09 0,46 0,71 0,03 0,7% 2 5,46 341 3 362
HONG KONG 0,24 0,50 0,02 0,02 0,15 0,20 0,01 0,27 1,31 11,49 1,64 7,59 1,43 0,00 3,8% 5 5,11 952 9 861
INDONESIA 0,14 0,45 0,06 -0,03 0,13 0,30 0,00 0,40 1,39 11,34 0,44 0,40 -0,68 0,12 4,9% 2 5,67 336 3 137
IRELAND 0,19 0,65 0,06 -0,05 0,15 0,24 0,01 0,33 1,62 12,53 1,37 0,59 1,60 0,03 6,1% 4 5,74 72 433
ISRAEL 0,20 0,36 0,04 0,00 0,16 0,32 0,03 0,24 1,29 11,48 0,86 0,81 0,90 0,02 4,1% 3 5,75 341 1 870
ITALY 0,15 0,57 0,04 -0,06 0,14 0,27 0,01 0,25 1,30 12,85 1,21 0,40 0,55 0,02 0,5% 1 5,72 276 1 968
JAPAN 0,21 0,75 0,04 -0,01 0,13 0,25 0,01 0,31 1,13 12,95 3,15 0,74 1,30 -0,01 0,8% 4 5,26 3 984 39 283
KOREA (SOUTH) 0,18 0,52 0,04 -0,01 0,15 0,27 0,01 0,34 1,10 11,95 1,45 0,75 0,93 0,02 4,2% 2 5,41 1 673 13 081
MALAYSIA 0,14 0,58 0,04 0,03 0,13 0,24 0,00 0,39 1,11 10,95 1,30 1,43 0,50 0,04 5,1% 4 5,85 952 8 410
MEXICO 0,10 0,44 0,06 0,03 0,13 0,25 0,00 0,42 1,26 13,21 0,36 0,28 -0,50 0,09 2,6% 1 5,95 123 1 097
NETHERLANDS 0,12 0,64 0,08 -0,01 0,14 0,25 0,01 0,27 1,70 13,28 1,56 1,03 1,74 0,02 2,6% 2 5,17 206 1 370
NEW ZEALAND 0,09 0,68 0,04 0,02 0,14 0,23 0,01 0,40 1,55 11,22 1,30 0,35 1,85 0,02 2,5% 4 6,21 113 668
PHILIPPINES 0,15 0,43 0,05 -0,06 0,14 0,21 0,00 0,35 1,37 10,56 0,52 0,55 -0,44 0,05 4,9% 3 6,18 155 1 313
PORTUGAL 0,08 0,54 0,05 -0,04 0,13 0,35 0,00 0,35 1,14 12,10 1,39 0,40 1,16 0,03 1,7% 3 5,94 81 519
SINGAPORE 0,21 0,60 0,05 0,00 0,14 0,22 0,00 0,32 1,20 11,45 0,80 2,06 1,61 0,01 5,8% 4 5,50 640 4 915
SOUTH AFRICA 0,15 0,63 0,08 -0,03 0,14 0,17 0,00 0,32 1,44 12,07 1,73 1,92 0,09 0,08 3,0% 5 4,99 446 2 432
SPAIN 0,12 0,64 0,06 -0,02 0,14 0,26 0,01 0,35 1,50 12,86 1,55 0,91 1,22 0,03 2,4% 4 5,79 160 1 189
SWEDEN 0,17 0,51 0,03 -0,01 0,15 0,19 0,02 0,21 1,80 11,61 1,28 0,90 1,88 0,02 2,3% 3 6,04 456 2 585
SWITZERLAND 0,18 0,70 0,07 -0,01 0,14 0,22 0,02 0,33 1,64 13,05 1,65 2,11 1,88 0,01 2,0% 2 4,94 213 1 899
TURKEY 0,13 0,39 0,06 0,01 0,13 0,22 0,00 0,34 1,43 11,94 0,59 0,30 0,05 0,18 4,3% 2 5,77 232 1 942
UNITED KINGDOM 0,15 0,61 0,04 -0,04 0,15 0,19 0,02 0,30 1,74 11,64 1,48 1,28 1,67 0,02 2,5% 5 5,55 2 235 10 919
UNITED STATES 0,17 0,31 0,04 -0,04 0,15 0,25 0,03 0,29 1,87 12,55 2,05 1,27 1,54 0,02 2,8% 5 5,77 6 753 36 718
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they can be seen as substitutes for cash holdings. To reduce the probability of experiencing 
financial distress, firms with higher leverage are expected to hold more cash. That explains the 
negative correlation between leverage and cash holdings. Concerning to industry sigma a negative 
correlation with cash holdings was found. Firms present more volatile cash flows face a higher 
probability of experiencing cash shortages due to unexpected cash flow deterioration. Thus, cash 
flow uncertainty should be positively related with cash holdings.  Research and development 
present a positive relation with cash holdings. In fact, once research and development produces 
valuable investment opportunities, the cost of being financially constrained is higher for firms 
that adopt such type of investment strategies. Tangibility, on the other hand, is negatively 
correlated with cash holdings. This result is consistent with the notion that tangible assets can be 
sold if a cash shortfall occurs and that firms with more collaterals encounter fewer problems 
issuing debt. Firms´ growth opportunities are negatively with cash holdings. That can have 
happened as result of the cost of incurring in a cash shortage is higher for firms with a larger 
investment opportunity set due to the expected losses that result from giving up valuable 
investment opportunities. 
 Regarding external finance it is not obvious that cash holdings are a substitute of them. 
In fact, a positive relationship between domestic credit (and market capitalization) and cash 
holdings is observed. On the other hand, there is a negative correlation between collectivism and 
cash holdings. It seems that firms placed in countries where citizens are more confident need to 
hold less cash.   
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Table 2 – Correlation Coefficients 
All firm variables are from Worldscope. CH is cash and cash equivalents by net assets (total assets minus 
cash and cash equivalents). DividendD is a binary variable. Cash-flow is the ratio of cash-flow to assets. 
Cash-flow is earnings less dividends plus amortizations. NWC is the ratio of working capital minus cash 
and short-term investments to total sales. Cash-flow uncertainty is the volatility of a firm´ s cash-flow (to 
assets) from 1995 to 2014. Industry sigma represents the annual average volatility of the firm´s sector from 
1995 to 2014. D/A is computed as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. R&D is R&D expenses to 
sales ratio. Firms that do not report R&D expenses are considered to have zero R&D expenses. Tang is 
measured by tangible assets to total assets. MtB is total liabilities plus market capitalization to total assets. 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets deflated in 1995 dollars. DC is defined 
as domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP (source: World Bank). MK is capital 
market development and is defined as the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage 
of GDP (source: World Bank). RL is rule of law and (Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)). Estimate of governance (ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance). Inflation is from World Bank. GDP 
Growth source is also from World Bank. SR are shareholder rights and varies from 1 to 5 (La Porta et al. 
(1999)). Collectivism index is from Globe (https://globeproject.com/study_2004_2007#data) and 
varies from 1 (low collectivism) to 7 (high collectivism). Firms and N are the number of firms and 
observations, respectively. Sample period is from 1995 to 2014. 
 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
The results presented in Table 3 show how cash holdings react to firm variables and to an 
institutional setting. The institutional setting is based on external sources of financing (domestic 
credit and capital market development), macroeconomic variables (inflation and GDP growth), 
Cash 
Holdings
Dividend
D
CF NWC Industry 
Sigma
D/A R&D Tang MtB Size DC MK RL Inflation GDP 
Growth
SR Collectivism
Cash Holdings 1,00
DividendD 0,02 1,00
CF 0,00 0,29 1,00
NWC -0,24 0,02 0,04 1,00
Industry Sigma 0,16 -0,20 -0,08 -0,05 1,00
D/A -0,35 -0,13 -0,11 0,00 -0,15 1,00
R&D 0,17 -0,11 -0,14 -0,02 0,19 -0,09 1,00
Tang -0,28 -0,01 0,03 -0,01 -0,09 0,19 -0,13 1,00
MtB 0,20 -0,05 -0,02 -0,07 0,19 -0,12 0,16 -0,11 1,00
Size -0,12 0,39 0,31 -0,05 -0,23 0,16 -0,05 -0,07 -0,09 1,00
DC 0,10 0,12 -0,01 -0,04 -0,03 0,02 0,05 -0,04 -0,06 0,23 1,00
MK 0,08 -0,03 -0,02 0,01 0,03 -0,05 -0,02 -0,06 0,02 -0,05 -0,03 1,00
RL 0,04 -0,05 -0,05 0,00 0,16 -0,08 0,10 -0,06 0,12 -0,01 0,30 0,16 1,00
Inflation -0,05 -0,06 0,01 0,00 -0,02 0,00 -0,03 0,05 0,03 -0,09 -0,40 -0,05 -0,41 1,00
GDP Growth -0,02 -0,02 0,04 0,03 0,00 -0,02 -0,03 0,04 0,07 -0,11 -0,39 0,18 -0,15 0,15 1,00
SR 0,03 -0,08 -0,04 -0,07 0,11 -0,05 0,08 0,03 0,10 -0,02 0,36 0,32 0,35 -0,13 0,03 1,00
Collectivism -0,09 -0,22 -0,04 -0,04 0,13 -0,01 0,07 0,11 0,14 -0,18 -0,32 -0,23 0,03 0,22 0,19 0,30 1,00
 15 
 
investors protection (shareholders rights and rule of law), and national culture (collectivism). We 
consider cross section regressions with year, country and industry dummies, a panel data of firms 
(on yearly basis) with random and fixed effects, and a dynamic panel data model based on 
generalized method of moments estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), which includes one lag 
of the dependent variable used as an independent variable.  
Concerning dynamic panel, the results obtained for Sargan test confirm their 
overidentification, that is, the hypothesis of instruments be valid was not accepted.  The 
hypothesis for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors was also not accepted. In fact, 
Arellano and Bond approach is designed for situations with ‘small T, large N’ panels: few time 
periods and many individual units. We also evaluate if individual effects were correlated with the 
other regressors in the model and the results of Hausman test (1978) confirmed that the fixed 
effect model is consistent and random effects model is inconsistent.  
The signals of firms´ variables are, in general, in line with the theory. Cash holdings respond 
positively to cash flows increases. This is in line with pecking order theory, that is, internal funds 
are less expensive than external funds. On the other hand, size and tangibility influence negatively 
cash holdings. In fact, larger firms with tangible assets need less levels of cash as a precaution to 
eventual cash shortfalls because they have an easily access to external funds. Liquidity, by its 
turn, influence negatively cash holdings. Liquidity is a substitute of cash holdings and 
consequently firms with more liquid assets substitutes are expected to hold less cash. Regarding 
the impact of growth opportunities on cash holdings we have found a positive value for the 
referred parameter. The larger losses of giving up valuable investment opportunities occur when 
we are in the presence of a firm with a larger investment opportunity set and such explains the 
positive impact of MtB on cash holdings. Finally, the results of table 3 also show a positive impact 
of R&D on cash holdings. Being R&D a proxy for financial distress it was expected a positive 
impact of such variable on cash holdings, and such was confirmed. 
The results obtained for the impact of macroeconomic variables, as well as for institutional 
variables, investors protection variables and cultural variables are less consensual than firm 
variables. However, domestic credit has a positive impact on cash holdings and seems to strength 
the agency hypothesis, e. g., firms in a presence of an easier institutional setting to obtain external 
finance maintain highly levels of cash once it is more difficult to extract wealth from investors by 
management. Rule of law, by its turn, influence positively cash holdings. This result was not 
expected, as the more rule of law a country has, the lower the cash holdings a firm should have. 
In fact, we would expect that firms´ managers located on undeveloped capital markets and where 
investors are lower protected would prefer to hold cash to invest on projects that increase their 
non-pecuniary benefits, but with a negative impact on shareholder wealth. These results do not 
support the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986), which assumes that if investors have less 
control over the firm, managers will have an incentive to accumulate cash to gain discretionary 
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power over the firm investment decisions. Thus, firms in countries with superior investor 
protection and better law enforcement are expected to hold less cash. Shareholder rights, 
contrarily to rule of law, seems to influence negatively cash holdings, in line with agency 
hypothesis and with the results in Dittmar et al. (2003). Collectivism, by its side, also influence 
negatively cash holdings. That means the more individualist a country is, the lower cash holdings 
a firm has, in line with Chen et al. (2015). Actually, an optimistic behavior by investors has as 
consequence a lower level of cash to face different alternative scenarios. 
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Table 3 – Regression of cash holding using firm and country level variables 
Dependent variable is cash holdings. Cash holdings is cash and cash equivalents by net assets (total assets 
minus cash and cash equivalents). DividendD is a binary variable. Cash-flow is the ratio of cash-flow to 
assets. Cash-flow is earnings less dividends plus amortizations. NWC is the ratio of working capital minus 
cash and short-term investments to total sales. Cash-flow uncertainty is the volatility of a firm´ s cash-flow 
(to assets) from 1995 to 2014. Industry sigma represents the annual average volatility of the firm´s sector 
from 1995 to 2014. D/A is computed as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. R&D is R&D expenses 
to sales ratio. Firms that do not report R&D expenses are considered to have zero R&D expenses. Tang is 
measured by tangible assets to total assets. MtB is total liabilities plus market capitalization to total assets. 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets deflated in 1995 dollars. DC is defined 
as domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP (source: World Bank). MK is capital 
market development and is defined as the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage 
of GDP (source: World Bank). RL is rule of law and (Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)). Estimate of governance (ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance). Inflation is from World Bank. GDP 
Growth source is also from World Bank. SR are shareholder rights and varies from 1 to 5 (La Porta et al. 
(1999)). Collectivism index is from Globe (https://globeproject.com/study_2004_2007#data) and 
varies from 1 (low collectivism) to 7 (high collectivism). N are the number of observations, respectively. 
Sample period is from 1995 to 2014.The GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond 1991) is used. 
AR (1) and AR (2) represent the tests Arellano-Bond absence of serial autocorrelation of 1st and 2nd order 
residuals, where the null hypothesis is the absence of autocorrelation tailings. The Sargan test is the test of 
over-identifying restrictions. The p-values are in parentheses below the corresponding robust parameter 
estimates. 
 
 
Year, Industry 
and Country 
dummies
Year and 
Country 
dummies
Year and 
Industry 
dummies
Country and 
Industry 
dummies
Industry 
dummies
Random 
Effects
Fixed Effects GMM
Cash Holdings t-1 -0,017
(p-value) 0,96
DividendDt 0,005 0,003 0,011 0,005 0,011 0,007 0,005 -0,161
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02
CFt 0,065 0,066 0,058 0,065 0,057 0,054 0,054 0,170
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50
NWCt -0,175 -0,178 -0,175 -0,175 -0,175 -0,207 -0,220 -0,439
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02
IndustrySigma t (omitted) 0,290 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 0,460 (omitted) (omitted)
p-value 0,00 0,00
D/At -0,253 -0,257 -0,250 -0,254 -0,252 -0,190 -0,163 -0,079
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
R&Dt 0,357 0,367 0,343 0,357 0,342 0,157 0,062 -0,003
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,91
Tangt -0,178 -0,167 -0,172 -0,178 -0,173 -0,267 -0,326 -0,397
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
MtBt 0,024 0,024 0,021 0,235 0,021 0,017 0,016 0,011
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Size t -0,011 -0,010 -0,012 -0,011 -0,012 -0,012 -0,012 -0,005
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DCt 0,007 0,007 0,034 0,013 0,034 0,017 -0,001 0,019
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,71 0,00
MKt -0,001 -0,001 0,006 -0,001 0,006 0,000 -0,002 0,001
p-value 0,15 0,14 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,70 0,00 0,38
RLt 0,030 0,030 -0,018 0,034 -0,019 -0,002 0,025 0,009
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,27 0,00 0,02
Inflation t 0,014 0,014 -0,063 0,012 -0,064 -0,021 -0,010 -0,004
p-value 0,18 0,16 0,00 0,24 0,00 0,00 0,22 0,72
GDPGrowtht -0,055 -0,054 0,303 -0,072 0,145 0,039 0,007 -0,049
p-value 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,56 0,00
SRt (omitted) (omitted) -0,007 (omitted) -0,008 -0,001 (omitted) (omitted)
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,13
Col lectivismt (omitted) (omitted) -0,046 (omitted) -0,042 -0,061 (omitted) (omitted)
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00
R
2 0,30 0,30 0,29 0,30 0,29 0,18 0,18
N 202 871 202 871 202 871 202 871 202 871 202 871 202 871 127 902
Sargan Test 550,787
p-value 0,00
AR (1) -37,155
p-value 0,00
AR (2) -1,915
p-value 0,06
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The consolidation of the panel was an alternative found to the panel presented previously. 
In fact, we created a panel based on firms with 20 years of data. After that, we calculate the firms´ 
annual average by country, and consequently we have a panel with similar figures for T and N.  
In general, the signs of parameters presented in table 3 are similar to those presented in 
table 4. However, we highlight the similitude of signs of the following parameters: net working 
capital, tangibility, market-to-book and domestic credit. 
During the period from 2008 to 2014 cash holdings behaved differently. In fact, cash 
holdings have decreased in 2008. Probably, such was a result of negative unexpected cash flows. 
In 2009 and 2010 firms´ cash holdings have reacted positively as a precaution to recent financial 
crisis and to an eventual cash short fall. However, in the period from 2008 to 2014 we have 
assisted to a cash holdings decreases and such can have been a simultaneous result of domestic 
credit increases, substituting internal funds by financing banking, and cash flow decreases, and 
consequently internal funds.     
Concerning to the interaction between the variables crisis with shareholder rights the results 
confirm the hypothesis that the higher shareholders rights a firm is located on, the lower cash 
holdings a firm has in 2008. It looks the hypothesis of unexpected lower cash flows is confirmed, 
as well as the free cash flow theory of Jensen.  For the period from to 2009 to 2010 the impact of 
shareholder rights presents an opposite signal, supporting the precautionary hypothesis. For the 
whole period the negative impact of shareholder rights is confirmed. In fact, the impact of 
shareholders rights is negative in 2008 and in the whole period, contrarily to 2009 and 2010.  
Finally, the results obtained for collectivism are similar to those found to shareholder rights. 
The negative impact of the composite variable, particularly of the optimistic variable, on cash 
holdings have confirmed the optimistic hypothesis. In fact, firms seem to tolerate uncertainty and 
ambiguity and consequently take more and greater risks, using more external funds. This is also 
valid for the period from 2008 to 2014. On the contrary, on the period from 2009 to 2010 the 
impact of the composite variable was positive. Such have signified that the impact of an increase 
on collectivist variable on 2009-2010 period have influenced positively cash holdings. 
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Table 4 – Regression of cash holding using firm and country level variables 
Dependent variable is cash holdings. Cash holdings is cash and cash equivalents by net assets (total assets 
minus cash and cash equivalents). DividendD is a binary variable. Cash-flow is the ratio of cash-flow to 
assets. Cash-flow is earnings less dividends plus amortizations. NWC is the ratio of working capital minus 
cash and short-term investments to total sales. Cash-flow uncertainty is the volatility of a firm´ s cash-flow 
(to assets) from 1995 to 2014. Industry sigma represents the annual average volatility of the firm´s sector 
from 1995 to 2014. D/A is computed as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. R&D is R&D expenses 
to sales ratio. Firms that do not report R&D expenses are considered to have zero R&D expenses. Tang is 
measured by tangible assets to total assets. MtB is total liabilities plus market capitalization to total assets. 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets deflated in 1995 dollars. DC is defined 
as domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP (source: World Bank). MK is capital 
market development and is defined as the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage 
of GDP (source: World Bank). RL is rule of law and (Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)). Estimate of governance (ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance). Inflation is from World Bank. GDP 
Growth source is also from World Bank. SR are shareholder rights and varies from 1 to 5 (La Porta et al. 
(1999)). Collectivism index is from Globe (https://globeproject.com/study_2004_2007#data) and 
varies from 1 (low collectivism) to 7 (high collectivism). N are the number of observations, respectively. 
Sample period is from 1995 to 2014.The GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond 1991) is used. 
AR (1) and AR (2) represent the tests Arellano-Bond absence of serial autocorrelation of 1st and 2nd order 
residuals, where the null hypothesis is the absence of autocorrelation tailings. The Sargan test is the test of 
over-identifying restrictions. The p-values are in parentheses below the corresponding robust parameter 
estimates. 
 
Industry 
dummies
Random 
Effects
Cash Holdings t-1 0,627 0,465 0,457 0,626 0,442 0,505 0,492 0,475 0,464 0,578
(p-value) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DividendDt -0,013 0,004 -0,002 -0,004 0,000 -0,006 -0,007 0,001 -0,016 -0,005 0,000 -0,005
p-value 0,40 0,78 0,84 0,67 0,99 0,66 0,44 0,95 0,18 0,62 0,97 0,69
CFt -0,193 0,092 0,161 0,447 0,034 0,066 0,030 0,031 0,044 0,433 0,036 0,067
p-value 0,08 0,29 0,00 0,14 0,59 0,43 0,62 0,62 0,57 0,15 0,57 0,42
NWCt -0,289 -0,234 -0,194 -0,213 -0,202 -0,266 -0,277 -0,209 -0,240 -0,211 -0,201 -0,254
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
IndustrySigma t -0,203 -0,207 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
p-value 0,20 0,71
D/At -0,095 -0,145 0,004 -0,020 -0,044 -0,064 -0,099 -0,055 -0,071 -0,020 -0,042 -0,064
p-value 0,01 0,00 0,94 0,74 0,43 0,36 0,03 0,34 0,24 0,74 0,45 0,36
R&Dt 0,984 0,237 -1,663 0,064 -1,209 -0,936 -0,917 -2,357 0,752 0,144 -1,292 -0,960
p-value 0,03 0,59 0,23 0,96 0,44 0,69 0,44 0,23 0,63 0,91 0,41 0,68
Tangt -0,220 -0,183 -0,573 -0,308 -0,443 -0,499 -0,288 -0,368 -0,398 -0,312 -0,447 -0,490
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00
MtBt 0,002 0,008 0,030 0,009 0,025 0,026 0,009 0,023 0,015 0,009 0,026 0,023
p-value 0,80 0,27 0,00 0,28 0,01 0,00 0,27 0,03 0,06 0,24 0,01 0,01
Size t -0,009 -0,011 -0,009 -0,019 -0,006 0,007 0,000 -0,006 -0,004 -0,019 -0,006 0,003
p-value 0,03 0,00 0,46 0,03 0,69 0,63 0,98 0,69 0,78 0,03 0,70 0,24
DCt 0,007 -0,009 0,042 0,035 0,031 0,050 0,025 0,032 0,036 0,035 0,032 0,047
p-value 0,34 0,40 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,08 0,04 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,00
MKt 0,004 0,004 -0,006 -0,005 -0,003 -0,005 -0,005 -0,004 -0,005 -0,005 -0,003 -0,005
p-value 0,11 0,14 0,23 0,33 0,63 0,37 0,38 0,48 0,43 0,34 0,63 0,39
RLt -0,010 -0,009 -0,010 -0,027 -0,010 -0,016 -0,029 -0,016 -0,006 -0,027 -0,011 -0,015
p-value 0,08 0,47 0,39 0,06 0,36 0,13 0,06 0,25 0,57 0,06 0,35 0,15
Inflationt 0,093 0,065 0,104 0,045 0,094 0,092 0,038 0,083 0,074 0,047 0,095 0,088
p-value 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
GDPGrowtht 0,274 -0,129 -0,178 -0,093 -0,079 -0,186 -0,064 -0,058 -0,119 -0,093 -0,082 -0,183
p-value 0,03 0,12 0,00 0,09 0,15 0,00 0,21 0,27 0,06 0,09 0,14 0,00
SR -0,004 -0,002 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
p-value 0,25 0,85
Col lectivism -0,037 -0,046 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
p-value 0,00 0,23
Cris is 2008 -0,015
p-value 0,00
Cris is 2009-2010 0,017
p-value 0,00
Cris is 2008-2014 -0,017
p-value 0,02
Cris is 2008 * SR -0,005
p-value 0,00
Cris is 2009-2010 * SR 0,004
p-value 0,00
Cris is 2008-2014 * SR -0,006
p-value 0,00
Cris is 2008 *  Collectivism -0,003
p-value 0,01
Cris is 2009-2010 *  Collectivism 0,003
p-value 0,00
Cris is 2008-2014 * Collectivism -0,003
p-value 0,01
R2 0,44 0,30
N 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468
Sargan Test 14,76 11,69 12,46 13,42 13,06 13,72 16,44 11,81 12,39 13,93
p-value 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
AR (1) -1,78 -2,49 -2,13 -2,43 -2,43 -2,10 -2,23 -2,49 -2,13 -2,41
p-value 0,08 0,01 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,04 0,03 0,01 0,03 0,02
AR (2) -1,28 -2,03 -1,38 -1,55 -1,64 -1,41 -1,67 -2,03 -1,38 -1,59
p-value 0,20 0,04 0,17 0,12 0,10 0,16 0,09 0,04 0,17 0,11
GMM System
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Finally, on table 5 we show the results of the previous composite variable by legal 
environment and capital market development. The results express a negative impact on cash 
holdings in 2008 of common law based systems where shareholders are highly protected. The 
opposite occurred in 2009 and 2010. On the other hand, cash holdings have reacted negatively 
in 2008 to developed capital markets with high shareholders rights. By its turn, in 2009 and 
2010 the impact has been positive. From 2008 to 2014 we have observed a negative impact of 
the composite variable Crisis2008-2014*SR either in common law based countries or in developed 
capital markets, although without statistical significance. The results obtained for the composite 
variable crisis * Collectivism on cash holdings in 2008 was negative either on common law 
based countries, or in developed capital market. The opposite occurred two years following. On 
the other hand, on the whole period we observed a negative impact of the composite variable on 
cash holdings, although without statistical significance when legal regime is taken into 
consideration.  
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Table 5 – Cash holdings and financial crisis  
Dependent variable is cash holdings. Cash holdings is cash and cash equivalents by net assets (total assets 
minus cash and cash equivalents). DividendD is a binary variable. Cash-flow is the ratio of cash-flow to 
assets. Cash-flow is earnings less dividends plus amortizations. NWC is the ratio of working capital minus 
cash and short-term investments to total sales. Cash-flow uncertainty is the volatility of a firm´ s cash-
flow (to assets) from 1995 to 2014. Industry sigma represents the annual average volatility of the firm´s 
sector from 1995 to 2014. D/A is computed as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. R&D is R&D 
expenses to sales ratio. Firms that do not report R&D expenses are considered to have zero R&D 
expenses. Tang is measured by tangible assets to total assets. MtB is total liabilities plus market 
capitalization to total assets. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets deflated 
in 1995 dollars. DC is defined as domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP 
(source: World Bank). MK is capital market development and is defined as the total value of all listed 
shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (source: World Bank). RL is rule of law and (Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)). Estimate of 
governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance). Inflation 
is from World Bank. GDP Growth source is also from World Bank. SR are shareholder rights and varies 
from 1 to 5 (La Porta et al. (1999)). Collectivism index is from Globe 
(https://globeproject.com/study_2004_2007#data) and varies from 1 (low collectivism) to 7 (high 
collectivism). N are the number of observations, respectively. Sample period is from 1995 to 2014.The 
GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond 1991) is used. AR (1) and AR (2) represent the tests 
Arellano-Bond absence of serial autocorrelation of 1st and 2nd order residuals, where the null hypothesis 
is the absence of autocorrelation tailings. The Sargan test is the test of over-identifying restrictions. The 
p-values are in parentheses below the corresponding robust parameter estimates. 
 
 
 
 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cash Holdings t-1 0,673 0,579 0,401 0,673 0,554 0,501 0,666 0,581 0,389 0,319 0,515 0,528
(p-value) 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,09 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,00
DividendDt 0,004 -0,001 -0,014 0,012 -0,005 -0,017 0,006 -0,002 -0,012 0,003 -0,001 -0,008
p-value 0,74 0,93 0,28 0,50 0,63 0,16 0,63 0,89 0,34 0,84 0,95 0,53
CFt 0,116 0,093 0,047 0,150 0,054 0,063 0,117 0,090 0,049 0,085 0,038 0,090
p-value 0,06 0,15 0,54 0,08 0,44 0,44 0,07 0,17 0,53 0,23 0,59 0,28
NWCt -0,263 -0,191 -0,234 -0,226 -0,215 -0,244 -0,257 -0,192 -0,274 -0,168 -0,213 -0,201
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
D/At -0,086 -0,020 -0,066 -0,015 -0,046 -0,070 -0,094 0,019 -0,089 -0,042 -0,056 -0,024
p-value 0,05 0,73 0,33 0,81 0,43 0,29 0,07 0,75 0,17 0,49 0,33 0,73
R&Dt -1,943 -2,142 0,780 -4,105 -1,280 0,878 -1,951 -1,989 0,052 -2,679 -2,260 0,164
p-value 0,22 0,31 0,70 0,18 0,51 0,55 0,28 0,29 0,98 0,27 0,30 0,92
Tangt -0,438 -0,446 -0,343 -0,588 -0,406 -0,399 -0,407 -0,446 -0,315 -0,439 -0,377 -0,473
p-value 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00
MtBt 0,023 0,026 0,012 0,030 0,024 0,015 0,020 0,027 0,012 0,011 0,022 0,021
p-value 0,04 0,02 0,13 0,00 0,02 0,04 0,04 0,02 0,10 0,23 0,03 0,03
Size t 0,007 -0,009 -0,015 0,008 -0,006 -0,010 0,007 -0,008 -0,009 -0,023 -0,005 -0,016
p-value 0,67 0,59 0,17 0,68 0,71 0,48 0,69 0,59 0,49 0,00 0,74 0,09
DCt 0,037 0,032 0,027 0,039 0,033 0,038 0,034 0,033 0,027 0,021 0,033 0,041
p-value 0,01 0,04 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,00 0,01 0,04 0,00 0,14 0,04 0,00
MKt -0,005 -0,006 -0,003 -0,010 -0,004 -0,005 -0,005 -0,006 -0,003 -0,005 -0,003 -0,006
p-value 0,37 0,26 0,62 0,07 0,50 0,45 0,42 0,26 0,64 0,31 0,51 0,35
RLt -0,019 -0,015 0,005 -0,015 -0,016 -0,007 -0,020 -0,015 0,005 -0,023 -0,014 -0,007
p-value 0,14 0,28 0,60 0,24 0,26 0,55 0,13 0,29 0,65 0,15 0,31 0,50
Inflationt 0,077 0,092 0,076 0,081 0,085 0,070 0,069 0,094 0,071 0,065 0,080 0,093
p-value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
GDPGrowtht -0,226 -0,102 -0,085 -0,342 -0,065 -0,110 -0,263 -0,099 -0,078 -0,096 -0,055 -0,137
p-value 0,07 0,06 0,13 0,00 0,26 0,05 0,07 0,07 0,13 0,11 0,29 0,03
Cris is 2008 * SR * Law -0,004
p-value 0,04
Cris is 2009-10 * SR * Law 0,004
p-value 0,04
Cris is 2008-14 * SR * Law -0,004
p-value 0,24
Cris is 2008 * SR * Developed -0,005
p-value 0,00
Cris is 2009-10 * SR * Developed 0,005
p-value 0,00
Cris is 2008-14 * SR * Developed -0,004
p-value 0,19
Cris is 2008 * Collectivism * Law -0,003
p-value 0,01
Cris is 2009-10 * Collectivism * Law 0,004
p-value 0,03
Cris is 2008-14 * Collectivism * Law -0,003
p-value 0,24
Cris is 2008 * Collectivism * Developed -0,003
p-value 0,00
Cris is 2009-10 * Collectivism * Developed 0,004
p-value 0,00
Cris is 2008-14 * Collectivism * Developed -0,003
p-value 0,03
N 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468
Sargan Test 12,27 13,94 17,72 13,44 13,81 16,92 12,53 13,79 17,17 13,48 13,92 16,09
p-value 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
AR (1) -2,04 -1,88 -2,30 -2,15 -1,84 -2,34 -2,16 -1,88 -2,64 -1,74 -2,19 -2,12
p-value 0,04 0,06 0,02 0,00 0,07 0,02 0,14 0,06 0,01 0,08 0,03 0,03
AR (2) -1,39 -1,36 -1,68 -1,45 -1,43 -1,57 -0,92 -1,37 -1,57 -1,63 -1,33 -1,47
p-value 0,17 0,17 0,09 0,15 0,15 0,12 0,36 0,17 0,12 0,10 0,18 0,14
Common  vs  Civil Developed vs  EmergingCommon  vs  Civil Developed vs  Emerging
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5.  CONCLUSION  
 
We contribute to the literature by studying the evolution of cash holdings during 
the crisis and post-crisis of 2008. The role of shareholder rights and culture had also been 
studied, particularly with the interaction of financial crisis of 2008.  
Our results have showed a negative impact of 2008 financial crisis and from 2008 
to 2014 on firms´ cash holdings. The opposite has happened in 2009 and 2010. In fact, 
firms´ cash holdings have increased in 2009 and 2010 as precaution face to the opposite 
impact observed in 2008 consequence of financial crisis. We highlight likewise the 
negative impact of cash holdings from 2008 to 2014, questioning whether the trend of 
cash holdings’ increasing will not have reached its maximum. Perhaps firms in face of 
the present levels cash holdings do not need to accumulate more cash to eventual 
shortfalls. 
Our results show a negative impact of the shareholder rights on cash holdings 
during the financial crisis of 2008. This result seems to strength the role of agency theory 
on cash holdings once it seems that managers are worried to use indiscriminately cash in 
negative NPV projects devaluating shareholder wealth. On the contrary, in 2009 and 2010 
we observe a positive impact of shareholder rights on cash holdings, contradicting agency 
theory. However, the opposite occurred in the period from 2008 to 2014, although the 
impact had not been conclusive for all countries. As we previous referred possibly 
precautionary motive is losing power as explanatory theory, contrarily to agency 
hypothesis.    
On the other hand, we also have showed that cash holdings from collectivistic 
countries expresses a higher decrease in 2008 and from 2008 to 2014, contrarily to 2009 
and 2010. The results for 2008 and from 2008 to 2014 contradicted our expectations once 
we would expect a lower decrease for nations where uncertainty and ambiguity is less 
tolerated. These results are extensively to countries with different levels of capital market 
development, but not to different countries with different kind of law.  
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